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advances in numerical techniques (see Judd 1989) and computing power, however, make
it fairly simple to deal with such problems.
This paper’s main contribution is to introduce a set of solution techniques—partly
analytic and partly numerical—that allow us to tackle the difficulties raised by forward-
looking expectations in the core-periphery model.
Using these techniques we find a very startling result. The inclusion of forward-
looking expectations leads to absolutely no change in the main results of the standard
core-periphery model. In particular, the ‘break’ and ‘sustain’ points are not affected
(these points identify, respectively, the levels of trade cost where symmetry becomes
unsustainable and where full agglomeration becomes sustainable). Moreover, we show
that under certain parameter values (mainly the level of migration costs), even the
model’s global stability properties are unaffected by the inclusion of forward-looking
expectations. Under these conditions the assumed myopia of migrants¾upon which the
model relies¾is truly an assumption of convenience.
We also show that when migration costs are sufficiently low, allowing for
forward-looking dynamics radically complicates the model’s global stability properties.
In particular, interesting ‘history versus expectations’ considerations arise and this
permits us to address formally the possibility that the agglomeration can be a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
The paper also makes a number less important and less novel points that
essentially serve to validate the literature’s current practices. The first and most obvious
of these is that the standard core-periphery model (CP model henceforth) is a dynamic
model, and that its main results are propositions about local stability of various equilibria.
That is, the main questions addressed by the CP model are, “When will agglomerations
occur when they have not yet occurred?” and “When will they be reversed when they
have?”
* These, of course, are nothing more than questions about the local stability of the
symmetric and core-periphery equilibria. Second, in order to evaluate the impact of
allowing forward-looking expectations, we re-derive the main results (i.e. local stability
results) using formal methods for judging local stability. This per se is not new; Puga
(1996) was the first to do it. What is demonstrated here is the slightly more general and
slightly less obvious result that the informal methods commonly used in the literature for
evaluating stability are mathematically equivalent to formal methods. Furthermore, we
evaluate global stability properties of the standard CP model using Liaponov’s direct
method. The literature typical ignores global stability properties, but when it does, it
relies on informal methods (e.g. the economy moves to the nearest stable equilibria).
Again, we show that these informal methods can be validated using Liaponov’s method.
The rest of the paper is in six parts. The next section presents the standard CP
model. The subsequent section (section 3) studies the model with static and forward-
looking expectations, showing that the ad hoc migration equation of the standard CP
model is consistent with quadratic adjustment costs and static expectations. The next
                                                
* In the words of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998, Chapter 5), the model’s principle concern is “how
the interactions among increasing returns at the firm level, transport costs, and factor mobility can cause
spatial economic structure to emerge and change.”3
section (section 4) uses formal stability analysis to show that the CP model’s informal
stability-checking techniques are equivalent to formal techniques. Section 5 shows that
introducing forward-looking expectations changes none of the basic results from the
standard model. The only new result concerns the global stability properties of the model,
namely that under certain parameter values the model is subject to history-versus-
expectations considerations. The last section presents some concluding remarks.
2. The Standard Core-Periphery Model
Krugman, Fujita and Venables (1998 Chapter 5)—henceforth FKV—provides a
definitive exposition of the standard CP model. This standard model assumes two
initially symmetric regions (north and south), two factors of production (workers L and
agriculturists A) and two sectors (manufactures X and agriculture Z). The
monopolistically competitive X-sector employs only L to produce output and faces
increasing returns with a linear cost function.  In particular, production requires a fixed
cost of F units of L in addition to aX units of L per unit of output. The Z-sector produces a
homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns using only A.  Z and
X are traded. Z trade is costless, but trade in X is inhibited by frictional (i.e. iceberg)
trade costs. Specifically, t³1 units of an X-variety must be shipped to sell one unit in the
other region. As usual, t is viewed as capturing all the costs of selling to distant markets,
not just transport costs, and t-1 is the tariff-equivalent of these costs.
Preferences of the representative consumer are:
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where CX and CZ are consumption of the X-variety composite and Z (respectively), m (a
mnemonic for manufacturing) is the expenditure share on X-varieties, n and n* are the
number (mass) of north and south varieties, and s is the constant elasticity of substitution
between X-varieties.
Regional supplies of A as well as the global supply of L are fixed, but the inter-
regional distribution of L is endogenous with L flowing in response to real wage
differences. As in FKV, migration is governed by the ad hoc migration equation:
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where L is the northern labour supply, L
w is the world labour supply, w, w* and w  are
the northern, southern and average real wages, w is the northern wage, P is the north’s
region-specific perfect price index. Analogous definitions hold for w* and P*.
 Observe
that migration occurs unless labour is concentrated in a single region or real wages are
equalised.4
2.1.   Intermediate Results and Normalisations
Utility optimisation yields a constant division of expenditure between X and Z,


















where E is region-specific expenditure.
On the supply side, free trade in Z equalises northern and southern agriculturists’
wage rates, viz. wA and wA*, as long as both nations make some Z. Under all
circumstances, both countries produce some Z as long as m<1/2. We maintain this
assumption throughout, so taking Z as numeraire pZ=wA=wA*=1. In the X-sector,
‘milling pricing’ is optimal, so measuring X in units such that aX=(1-1/s), the price of a
northern variety in its local and export markets are (respectively):
p   w           p    w == ,* t (4)
Similar pricing rules hold for southern firms.
Since mill pricing is optimal, operating profit (call this p) is the value of sales












The free entry condition is that the number of northern firms rises to the point where
p=wF. Using (5), the equilibrium number and scale of firms are:
F x F L n s s = = , / (6)
where x is the equilibrium output of a typical firm. Similar expressions define the
analogous southern variables.
The market for northern X-varieties must clear at all moments. The equilibrium
output per northern firm is sF and the producer price is w, so using (3) and rearranging,
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where R is a mnemonic for ‘retail sales’ and
s t f
- =
1 measures ‘free-ness’ (phi-ness) of
trade.
† Note that the free-ness of trade rises from f=0 (with infinite trade costs) to f=1
with zero trade costs. This expression and its southern equivalent are often called the
                                                
* Total northern production of X is (L-nF)/aX. Using our choice of units and symmetry of varieties yields
the expression for p.
† Due to markup price and iceberg trade costs, the value of a typical firm’s retail sales at consumer prices
always equals its revenue at producer prices. Thus R is also a mnemonic for revenue.5
wage equations since using (6), (7) can be written in terms of w and w* and the
equilibrium w, w* must satisfy the pair of market-clearing conditions.
For convenience, we follow Krugman (1991) and choose units of the world
endowments, L
w and A
w, such that w=w*=1 in the symmetric equilibrium. From the
wage equations, this holds when L
w=1 and A
wº2A=m/(1-m). Note that these choices also
imply that LºsLºL/L
w and that w=1 in the core-periphery outcome.
*
3. Static and Forward-Looking Expectations
The main purpose of this paper is to consider the theoretical implications of
expanding the CP model to include forward-looking expectations. To this end, this
section shows that the standard CP model is a special case of a more fully specified
dynamic model. An unintentional dividend of this demonstration is to provide more
rigorous foundations for the ad hoc migration equation used in the standard model.
†
3.1.  The Dynamic Problem and Optimal Migration Behaviour
Since the standard CP model is a dynamic model, intertemporal preferences of
agents need to be identified. Specifically, assume that the instantaneous utility function
(sometimes called the felicity function) is as in (1) and intertemporal preferences are:
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where r is the constant, subjective discount rate.
Optimal migration behaviour is simple to derive. Consider a southern household
that divides its labour between north and south to maximise the real earnings of its
members less some adjustment cost. Specifically, migration involves a cost that is
quadratic in the flow as a proportion of the sending and receiving region labour forces,
viz. 2 / )) 1 ( / (
2 L L m - g . Note that migration costs rise as the flow becomes a large share
of the receiving or sending population.
Observing that the real wage is an index for worker’s instantaneous utility (i.e. P
is a perfect price index), utility optimisation requires the household (which owns one unit
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* KFV takes L
w as m and A
w as 1-m, but wages are unity as long as L
w/A
w equals m/(1-m).
† FKV (chapter 5) assert that the ad hoc migration behaviour in the standard model has no deep
justification, but note that it is equivalent to ‘replicator dynamics’ (a concept routinely used in evolutionary
game theory). This section shows that ad hoc migration equation does have a deep justification; it is
consistent with dynamic optimisation, quadratic adjustment costs and static expectations.6
This allows for almost any sort of migration behaviour, including the possibility
that migrants will return and re-migrate.
* Taking  L m & º  as the control variable, the
current valued Hamiltonian is () Wm L L m L L + - - - + 2 / )) 1 ( / ( * ) 1 (
2 g w w  where W is the
co-state variable that captures the asset value of migration. The necessary conditions are
*) ( , / ) 1 ( w w r g - - = - = = W W L WL L m & &  which must hold at all moments and the
endpoint, or transversality condition  0 lim =
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r . Using our units-convention
(L
w=1 and L=sL) the migration equation is:
g / ) 1 ( L L L s Ws s - = & (10)
where W is the asset value of migrating now. As usual, W is governed by an asset-
pricing-like expression:
*) ( w w r - - = W W & (11)
3.2.  The Role of Expectations
If migrants assume that the current real wage gap will persist forever, then (11)
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The second expression, which is identical to FKV’s assumed migration equation, follows
from the first by choice of time units (such that rg=1) and the definition of w .
Summarising this result, we have:
Proposition 1:
The migration equation of the standard core-periphery model is consistent with
optimal migration behaviour subject to quadratic adjustment costs and static
expectations. When migrants’ expectations are forward-looking and model-
consistent (i.e. migrants use the model’s relationships to predict future real
wages), the model’s behaviour depends on the two non-linear differential
equations (10) and (11).
4. Stability Analysis with Static Expectations
The standard CP model is a dynamic model and its main results concern the
model’s local stability properties. This simple fact, however, can usually be ignored since
the standard approach to stability analysis (i.e. finding break and sustain points) relies on
a highly intuitive, informal method for checking stability. Unfortunately, it is not obvious
                                                
* The main restriction is that we rule out an infinite number of migrations in a finite period. Moreover since
the co-state variable must be a continuous function of time, the migrants cannot expect to change their
migration time path in the future.7
that the informal method (introduced by Krugman 1991a,b and extended by Puga 1996,
and FKV) carries over to the model with forward-looking expectations. Thus, in order to
evaluate the impact that forward-looking expectations have on the standard model’s main
results, we must first establish the mapping between well-known formal stability-
evaluation methods and the informal methods used in the CP literature.
4.1.  Informal Stability Analysis: Symmetric Equilibrium
Stability of equilibria in the core-periphery model is typically established using
the following informal method. Starting from an equilibrium point (symmetry or full
agglomeration), the allocation of L is perturbed by exogenously moving a small mass of
labour between regions. Firms are assumed to instantaneously enter or exit until pure
profits in both regions are restored to zero. For the symmetric equilibrium, one checks the
change in the real wage gap w-w*. If the change is negative, the perturbation creates self-
correcting forces, i.e. the displaced workers would wish to move back to their original
location. Otherwise the equilibrium is unstable since additional workers would be
attracted to the receiving region. For the full agglomeration equilibrium, which we
sometimes call the CP outcome, the stability test is based on the level of regional real
wages rather than on the change in the real wage gap. Namely, if the perturbation
produces a level of the real wage in the periphery that exceeds the real wage in the core,
the equilibrium is said to be unstable. Otherwise, it is stable.











where ‘sym’ and ‘CP’ indicate that the variables are evaluated at the symmetric and core-
periphery outcomes, respectively. The level of trade free-ness where the first expression
in (13) holds with equality is called the ‘break’ point, while the level where the second
expression holds with equality is called the ‘sustain’ point.
Using this method, one can establish (see FKV chapter 5) that: (i) the symmetric
equilibrium is stable only for sufficiently low levels of trade free-ness, (ii) that CP
outcomes are stable only for sufficiently high levels of trade free-ness, and (iii) that there
is a range of f for which both the symmetric and core-periphery outcomes are stable.
This is often illustrated with the so-called ‘tomahawk’ diagram (see figure 1). The
diagram shows the stable equilibria with heavy solid lines and unstable equilibria with
dashed lines. The ‘tomahawk’ moniker comes from viewing the stable-part of the
symmetric equilibrium as the handle of a double-edged axe.
Intuition for how such a complicated configuration can be generated from such a
simple model is gained by studying the impact of trade costs on the agglomeration and
dispersion forces. While garnering such intuition is important, the analysis is tangential to
the main thrust of the paper. The reasoning, therefore, is relegated to Appendix 1.8
4.2.  Formal Local Stability Analysis
As far as stability is concerned, the core-periphery model can be reduced to a
single non-linear ordinary differential equation (ODE), namely:
  * ]; [ ) 1 ( w w - º W W - = L L L L s s s s &  (14)
The function W[sL] cannot be written explicitly since the wage equations cannot be
solved for w and w* (this is why so many applications of CP model rely on numerical
simulations).
The formal approach to studying the local stability properties of (14) at various
points is simple. One approximates the non-linear ODE with a linear ODE and then
checks the sign of the coefficient on sL. If the coefficient is negative, the system is locally
stable (with a negative coefficient the state variable shrinks towards its steady-state level
as time passes). Otherwise it is locally unstable. The optimal linear approximation is
given by the first-order Taylor expansion, so the best linear approximation and
corresponding stability test are:
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Figure 1: The tomahawk diagram.9
where
o
L s  is the equilibrium point under investigation. Note that at the symmetric
equilibrium (i.e. sL=1/2) the necessary and sufficient condition for local stability is that
d(w-w*)/dsL<0. At the core-periphery outcome (i.e. sL=1) the necessary and sufficient
condition is (w-w*)<0. These line up exactly with the informal stability test proposed in
(13). To summarise this finding we write:
Proposition 2:
The informal stability test of the CP model corresponds exactly to formal, local
stability analysis of the CP model.
4.3.  Global Stability Analysis: Liaponov’s Direct Method
Local stability analysis is fine for most uses (such as finding the break and
sustains points). It is not sufficient, however, for fully characterising the model’s
behaviour when sL is away from a long-run equilibrium (e.g. when the process of
agglomeration is ‘en route’). The economic geography literature typically avoids
discussing what happens between long-run equilibria, but where is does it relies on a
heuristically approach. Namely, it is asserted that the system approaches the nearest
stable equilibrium that does not require crossing an unstable equilibrium. As with the
local stability analysis, this heuristic approach can be justified formally.
One simple approach to global stability analysis of non-linear ODEs is called
Liaponov’s direct method. Instead of working with a potentially complicated function of
the state variable (the solution to the non-linear ODE for sL, in this case), one works with
a simple function—defined on a specific region—that attains its minimum at the long-run
level of sL. If the simple function (called the Liaponov function) and its domain are









Figure 2: Global Stability Analysis
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its minimum as time passes and that this implies that the state variable also approaches its
long-run equilibrium as time passes. This is sufficient for showing that the system is
globally stable in the region (see Beavis and Dobbs, 1990 p.167 for details).
As is well known, the dynamics of the CP model depends upon the level of trade
free-ness. There are three qualitative cases (see figure 1). When trade free-ness is very
low (high trade costs), only the symmetric equilibrium is stable. When trade free-ness is
very high, only the CP equilibria are stable. For an intermediate level of trade costs the
model has five equilibria, three of which are stable (the symmetric and the two CP
outcomes) and two of which, U1 and U2, are unstable.
The most interesting case in terms of global stability analysis is third. Figure 2
shows the model’s ODE in this case. What we wish to show is that the system is globally
stable in the sense that the system always converges to one steady state or another
regardless of initial conditions.
Consider first stability in the open set sLÎ(U1,U2). The Liaponov function we
choose is (sL-1/2)
2/2. This satisfies the regularity conditions of Theorem 5.24 in Beavis
and Dobbs (1990), namely the equilibrium point and initial point are in the set, the
function is always positive on the set and the value of the function is zero at the
equilibrium. Most importantly,  0 ) 2 / 1 ( < - = L L s s V & &  for all t and for all non-equilibrium
values of sL in the set. To see this, note that sL is increasing when sL is less than ½, but
decreasing when sL exceeds ½. Since V is always decreasing and attains its minimum at
the symmetric steady state, we know that sL converges to the symmetric steady state
whenever the initial value is in the sLÎ(U1,U2) range. This range is sometimes called the
symmetric equilibrium’s ‘basin of attraction’.
 Next consider stability in the sLÎ(U2,1] interval with the Liaponov function (sL-
1)
2/2. This function meets all the regularity conditions and time-derivative condition, so
we know that sLÎ(U2,1] is the basin of attraction for the core-in-the-north CP outcome.
Similar reasoning implies that sLÎ[0,U1) is the basin of attraction for the core-in-the-
south CP outcome.
Finally, analogous reasoning can show that the CP model is globally stable in the
two simpler cases when only the symmetry outcome is stable and when only the CP
outcome is stable. Moreover, in the latter case, it is straightforward to establish that
(1/2,1] and [0,1/2) are, respectively, the basins of attractions for the core-in-the-north and
core-in-the-south CP outcomes.
We summarise these results as follows.
Proposition 3:
The CP model is globally stable in the sense that regardless of initial conditions,
migration drives the system to one steady state or another. Furthermore, the
heuristic approach to determining the system’s destination is confirmed by
formal methods.11
5. Forward-Looking Workers: History vs Expectations Revisited
One of the most persistent critiques of the CP model turns on its assumption that
worker care only about the current wage difference in making their migration decision.
This section relaxes this assumption by allowing for forward-looking behaviour.
Importantly, it shows that doing so implies absolutely no changes in the local stability
analysis (i.e. the break and sustain points) derived in the standard model. In this sense,
the assumption of static expectations can be viewed as a convenient simplification.
The section also shows that true usefulness of forward-looking expectations lies
in its impact on the models global stability properties. In particular, we show that with
forward-looking expectations the dynamics becomes much richer, but radically more
difficult. In particular, we find that the CP model displays ‘history versus expectations’
behaviour.
5.1.  Formal Local Stability Analysis
The first task is to map out local stability of the symmetric and CP equilibria. As
before the procedure is to use a linear approximation to the non-linear system given by
(10) and (11). The linearised system is  ) (
ss x x J x - = &  where 
T
L W s x ) , ( º  and J is the
Jacobian matrix (i.e. matrix of own and cross partials) evaluated at a particular steady
state. Specifically, J is:
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Local stability is determined by checking J’s eigenvalues at the symmetric and CP
outcomes. As usual, we can establish saddle path stability by finding one negative
eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue (if the eigenvalues are complex, then the test
involves the signs of the real parts).
*
One useful fact reduces our work. A standard result from linear algebra is that the
determinant of J equals the product of the eigenvalues (Beavis and Dobbs, 1990 p.161).
Thus the system is saddle-path stable, if and only if det(J)<0.  The determinant det(J) is
equal to (dW/dsL)sL(1-sL)/g-rW(1-2sL)/g, so for the symmetric equilibrium, the stability
test is (dW/dsL)/4g<0 and in the CP outcome it is rW/g<0, where the expressions and
derivatives are evaluated at the appropriate steady state. Noting that W in the CP
equilibrium equals  r w w / ) (
*
CP CP - , we see that the informal local stability test for the CP
model with static expectations—viz. expression (13)—is equivalent to the formal local
stability test for the CP model with forward-looking expectations. To summarise this
striking result we write:
                                                
* See the appendix to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for details and an excellent exposition of local
stability and phase diagram analysis.12
Proposition 4:
The informal stability test of the CP model with static expectations is exactly
equivalent to formal, local stability analysis of the CP model with forward-
looking expectations.
In particular, the break and sustain points in the model with forward-looking expectations
are identical to those in the model with static expectations.
5.2.  Global Stability Analysis with Multiple Equilibria
When trade costs are such that the CP model has a unique stable equilibrium,
local analysis is sufficient. After any shock, W will jump to put the system on the saddle
path leading to the unique stable equilibrium (if it did not, the system would diverge and
thereby violate a necessary condition for intertemporal optimisation). The same cannot be
said when trade costs are such that the model has multiple stable steady states. The point
is very simple. With multiple stable equilibria, we will have multiple saddle paths. In
principle, these may overlap so it is not clear which path the system must jump to. In
other words, the interesting possibility of history versus expectations may arise. We turn
now to exploring this possibility.
5.2.1.  Making Progress by Reversing Time
Dealing with non-linear differential equations is difficult, generally requiring
qualitative analysis using a phase diagram. While this works well with unique steady
states, it is not sufficient for dealing with the interesting case of multiple steady states.
Recent advances in computing speed and simulation software, however, have made it
possible to tackle such problems with a desktop computer. Before using these techniques,
we provide a simple example to illustrate the logic of the technique.
Consider the simple system of two linear ODEs depicted in figure 3. This system
is saddle path stable as drawn, so if it starts out on the stable arm, which corresponds to
the negative eigenvector, it converges to the steady state. If it starts out anywhere else, it







eigenvector) for any initial condition that is off of the stable arm. In this sense, the
instability is very stable. That is to say, the unstable arm is like a downward sloped
trough into which all motion is attracted. More to the point, this feature makes it easy to
find the unstable arm via numerical simulation.
The ease of identifying the unstable arm becomes interesting when we reverse
time. When time is run backward, the stable arm becomes the unstable arm and vice
versa.
* As a result, we can identify the stable arm (normally a very difficult task in a non-
linear model) by looking for the unstable arm in reverse time. Mechanically, we start
slightly off the steady state and then run time backward. The resulting path traces out
what will be the stable arm in normal time.
With non-linear ODEs we still need to rely on numerical simulation to find the
saddle path. Yet given the speed of recent PCs, the numerical approximation to the true
path can be made to be very accurate (an algorithm showing how the find these paths is
available from the author upon request).
5.2.2.  Phase Portraits and Overlaps
When trade costs are such that the model has multiple stable steady states, a
number of interesting possibilities arise (this corresponds to the overlapping heavy lines
in figure 1). The phase portrait for this case is shown in figure 4. Note that the  0 = L s &
schedule consists of the H-shape line made up of the horizontal axis between 0 and 1, and
                                                
* To see what we mean by reversing time, consider the differential equation 
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unstable in normal time, i.e. tÎ[0,¥). In reverse time, i.e. tÎ(-¥,0], the system becomes stable since
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the sL=1 and sL=0 lines. The  0 = W & schedule is the wave-like curve that crosses the x-
axis three times. The arrows qualitatively indicate the direction of motion off of the
isokines.
Before turning to the computer, a few facts should be pointed out. First, in normal
time, the U1 and U2 equilibrium are locally unstable (i.e. the real parts of their
eigenvalues are both positive), so in reverse time they are globally stable (i.e. have two
negative eigenvalues). What this means is that in reverse time they are ‘sinks’ in the
sense that a particle starting from anywhere in the diagram will eventually end up either
at U1 or U2.
* In particular, the saddle paths that end up at CPN, CPS, or ‘sym’ in normal
time, must originate in either U1 or U2. Second, horizontal motion limits to zero as the
system gets close to either sL=0 or 1, given (10). As a result, the system will never run
into the sL boundaries except when it starts on the saddle path leading to one of the CP
outcomes (even then, the system requires infinite time to reach equilibrium).
Using computer simulation (in reverse time), it is possible to find the saddle paths
for various parameter values. Consider three qualitatively different cases (in all
simulations we take s=5, m=4/10, r=1/10 and f=1/10).
The first case is when g, the migration cost parameter, is very large, so horizontal
movement is very slow. This is shown in Figure 5. Importantly, there is no overlap of
saddle paths in this case, so the global stability analysis with static expectations is exactly
right. That is, the basins of attraction for the various equilibria are the same with static
and forward-looking expectations. We summarise this as follows:
                                                
* This is not quite airtight since there is still the possibility of a limit cycle.
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When migration costs are sufficiently high, the global stability properties of the
forward-looking CP model are qualitatively the same as those of the static CP
model.
Taking this together with proposition 4 implies that the standard assumption of
static expectations is really an assumption of convenience when migration costs are
sufficiently high.
5.2.3.  History versus Expectations
The second case, shown in Figure 6, is for an intermediate value of migration
costs. Here there is some overlap since the Jacobian evaluated at either unstable
equilibrium has complex eigenvalues—this means that the system spirals out from U1 and
U2 in normal time. (The figure shows only the saddle paths in the right side of the
diagram since the left side is the mirror image of the right).
The existence of overlapping saddle paths changes things dramatically. If the
economy finds it itself with a level of sL that lays in the overlap, namely the interval
(A,B) shown in the figure, then a fundamental indeterminacy exists. Both saddle paths
provide perfectly rational adjustment tracks. That is, forward-looking workers who are
fully aware of how the economy works could adopt the path leading to the symmetric
outcome. It would, however, be equally rational for them to jump on the track that will
take them to the CPN outcome. Which track is taken cannot be decided in this model.
However, stepping slightly outside the model, one can believe that workers chose the
path that they think other workers will take. In the words of Matsuyama (1991) and
Krugman (1991c), expectations, rather than history, can matter.
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The final case is the most spectacular. Here migration costs are very low, so
horizontal movement is quite fast. As a result, the saddle path for CPN originates from U1
rather than U2. Interestingly, the overlap of saddle paths includes the symmetric
equilibrium. This raises the possibility that the economy could jump from the symmetric
equilibrium onto a path that leads it to a CP outcome mere because all the workers
expected that everyone else was going to migrate. Plainly, this raises the possibility of a
big-push drive by a government having some very dramatic effects.
Appendix 2 shows the computer generated output used to draw figures 6 and 7.
Finally note that the region of overlapping saddle paths will never include a CP
outcome. Thus, although one may ‘talk the economy’ out of a symmetric equilibrium,
one can never do the same for an economy that is already agglomerated.
5.2.4.  Necessary Conditions for Overlap
While it is difficult to characterise the constellation of parameters which
corresponds to each of the three cases, we can easily find a necessary and sufficient
condition for there to be some overlap of saddle paths. If the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
evaluated at the unstable equilibria are complex, then there must be some overlap, and if
there is some overlap the eigenvalues must be complex. The eigenvalues at U2 are
( ) 2 / / ) 1 ( ) / ( 4
2 g r r L L L s s ds d - W - ± , so we get complex roots when migration costs are
sufficiently low, namely when:
2
) 1 ( ) / ( 4
r
g
L L L s s ds d - W
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Consequently, we can write:
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The possibility of history-versus-expectations arises whenever the costs of
migration are low relative to the patience of workers (i.e. 1/r
2) and the impact
that migration has on the real wage gap (i.e. dW/dsL) is large.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that informal stability-checking techniques widely employed in
the ‘economic geography’ literature can be validated using formal methods. It also show
that the standard model’s assumption of static expectations is not as bad is it seems. In
particular, allowing forward-looking expectations changes none of the standard results,
since these essentially concern local stability (i.e. finding break and sustain points).
Adding forward-looking expectations, however, does enrich the model by opening the
door to history-versus-expectations considerations. To demonstrate this, the paper
introduces a simulation technique that permits full characterisation of the transitional
dynamics of the CP model’s non-linear differential equations.
This paper shows that putting forward-looking behaviour into the CP model and
addressing out-of-steady-state dynamics is quite simple. It seems, therefore, that it should
be easy to formally model the rich set of dynamic forces emphasised by classic growth
scholars such as Perroux (1955) and Hirschman (1958)
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Appendix 1: Decomposing Effects (Circular Causalities and
Local Competition)
There are three distinct forces governing stability in this model. Two of them—
demand-linked and cost-link circular causality (also called backward and forward
linkages)—are forces for agglomeration forces, i.e. they are de-stabilising. The third—the
local competition effect—is a force for dispersion, i.e. it is stabilising. The level of trade
costs changes the magnitude of each of the three forces. We turn now to illustrating the
forces and their dependence on trade costs.
The forces affecting the real wage gap are easily demonstrated at the symmetric
equilibrium due to a very handy fact. Starting from symmetry, all effect will be equal and
opposite. For instance, if the perturbation raises the northern wage, then it will lower the
southern wage with identical magnitudes. The real wage gap created by a migration
shock is therefore exactly twice the change in w, so we limit our study to dw.
The proportional change in the northern wage dw/w equals dw/w minus dP/P.
Consider first dw/w; w and w* are determined by the two market-clearing conditions—
expression (7) and its southern analogue. Finding dw/w would—in general—require us to
manipulate the total derivatives of the two market-clearing conditions (also known as the
wage equations). The equal-and-opposite fact, however, provides a shortcut. Using dw =
-dw*, dn=-dn*, dL=-dL* and dE=-dE*, dw/w can be found from (7) alone. Noting that E
and E* are themselves functions of the w’s and L’s, and re-writing (7), we get:
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D D 1 ; (19)
where the notation RDn, RDw and RDE is shorthand for (¶R/¶n-¶R/¶n*), (¶R/¶w-¶R/¶w*)
and (¶R/¶E-¶R/¶E*).
* Note that ‘b’ is always positive.








dP w n D D + = (20)
where again we have used implicit function notation, viz. P[w,w*,n,n*], for P and the
delta-notation to simplify the algebra. Combining (19) and (20), and using the free entry

































This equation shows a three-way decomposition of agglomeration and dispersion forces.
                                                
* More fully, RDn =(¶R/¶n)dn+(¶R/¶n*)dn*, but dn=-dn*.20
The first term is unambiguously negative since 1-PDw/P and ¶n/¶L are positive
and RDn—which is the local competition effect—is negative.
* It is called the local
competition effect since raising the number of northern firms and lowering the number of
southern firms intensifies competition in the north. This lowers sales per northern firm
and thus it is a force that tends to make firms like dispersion.
The second term in (21) captures the demand-linked circular causality. The terms
1-PDw/P and ¶E/¶L are positive. It is also true that RDE is positive since raising the size of
the northern market while simultaneously lowering the size of the southern market
(demand shifting) tends to boost the sales of north-based firms. The circularity comes
from the fact that migration shifts demand, shifting demand tends to raise the northern
wage gap and raising the gap tends to foster further migration. The final term in (11)
reflects cost-linked circular causality, i.e. forward linkages. PDn is positive since shifting
the production of varieties from south to north tends to lower the northern price index.
This is sometimes called the Venables effect, after Venables (1987). The circularity here
is that migration tends to lower the price index in the receiving region due the Venables
effect. This tends to boost the real wage, which in turns tends to attract more migrants.
†
Using the functional forms assumed, it is straightforward to show evaluate the
various derivatives in (21). The result is:
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Observe that the difference between a firm’s share in its local market and its
export market, namely (s-s*), enters each of the three terms. This market-share gap
obviously shrinks to zero as trade costs fall.
‡ Clearly then, the magnitude of both the
agglomeration and dispersion forces diminish as trade cost fall. This point is made
graphically in Figure A-1.
                                                
* Note that (1-PDw/P)>0 since PDw/P=nms and 1-nms =mns* by the adding up constraint on market shares.
† The terminology ‘backward and forward linkages’ is somewhat awkward here since they are generally
applied to the attractiveness of a location to firms. In this version of the model, however, we are
considering the attractiveness of a location to workers.
‡ The term (s-s*) is proportional to the ubiquitous ‘Z’ factor in FKV, namely Zºm(s-s*)/2.21
It is well known that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for very high trade costs
and unstable for very low trade costs. This fact implies that two things must happen.
First, at very high trade costs the local competition effect must outweigh the backward
and forward linkages. As KFV show, this is true as long as the ‘no black hole’ condition,
m<(1-1/s), holds. Second, falling trade costs must erode the local competition effect more
rapidly than the agglomeration forces. The figure illustrates both of these facts. The
bifurcation point (i.e. the level of trade costs where the nature of the model’s stability
changes) is where the agglomeration and dispersion forces are equally strong. This is
obvious from the figure, but more precisely, note that the market share difference is
squared in the local competition term, so the magnitude of the dispersion force falls more
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Figure A-1: Agglomeration and Dispersions Erode with f22
Appendix 2: Computer Output for Figures 6 and 7 (with normal time).